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Abstract: This paper discusses the different explana-
tory approaches taken by feminists and (Kleinian) psy-
choanalysts to women’s psychological illness. In par-
ticular, anorexia nervosa (a condition that has attracted
much feminist attention) is used as an example. Exam-
ination of some Kleinian accounts of work with anor-
exic patients reveals the great disparity between the
terms and focus of psychoanalytical explanation and
those invoked in feminist discussions. Can the two
perspectives be combined? It is argued that, despite its
individualist methodology, psychoanalysis stands to
gain from a broader understanding (that feminists might
supply) of the cultural “provocation” of psychic con-
flict. This reconciliation of perspectives would require
feminists to go beyond the “common sense” psycholo-
gy that they often presuppose and to acknowledge the
mediating influence of unconscious symbolic signifi-
cance in experience. In connection with this issue,
some work by feminists that has sought to accommo-
date psychoanalytical ideas is criticized for its “literal-
ism.” The lesson to be learned from this discussion
applies more widely than to the feminist case.
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In this paper, I pursue one thread drawnfrom the vast, controversial, and multifacet-ed topic of feminism’s relationship to psycho-
analysis. The question I consider is: What, if any,
are the possibilities for dialogue between femi-
nists and Kleinian psychoanalysis about the ex-
planation of women’s psychological illness? In
particular, because it affords such an excellent
illustration of the distance that can separate a
psychoanalytical perspective from the intuitions,
more grounded in common sense, that motivate
many feminist analyses, I take anorexia nervosa
as my example.1 As will become clear, the lessons
that can be learned from this investigation are of
wider significance, being applicable to all ef-
forts—not just feminist ones—to press psycho-
analysis into the service of social theory.
What do I mean by feminist? There are of
course many “feminisms” and strong disagree-
ments, relating both to theory and to practice,
divide them. It would be foolish to pretend that
everyone describing himself or herself as a femi-
nist would subscribe to the sort of analysis I
consider here. Rather, the sort of approach I
discuss is characteristic of the “liberal” feminist
tradition, insofar as it places at the center of its
analyses, and seeks to redress, the social and
economic inequalities between the sexes. Now, a
distinctive aspect of feminist thought—encapsu-
lated by the slogan “the personal is political”—
has been its insistence that the range of phenom-
ena that require a political analysis needs to be
extended. Feminists have theorized areas of ex-
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perience that were formerly thought of as “pri-
vate” in terms of political, social, and economic
structures that constrain women collectively. The
analyses of anorexia that I consider here are
among the fruits of this effort: disorders that
might have been understood as “merely” psy-
chological are regarded instead as a product of
the socio-economic structures typical of patriar-
chal capitalist society.
The epidemiology of eating disorders shows
an extraordinarily uneven distribution between
the sexes: The ratio of female to male sufferers is
around nine to one (Gordon 1990, 32). Further,
the onset of these disorders is predominantly in
late adolescence and early adulthood. These facts
encourage the idea that aspects of the social
experience of adolescent and young women play
an explanatory role in the onset of anorexia, and
feminist suggestions have pursued this line of
thought. Thus the importance placed on wom-
en’s appearance, and the power of the fashion,
advertising, and slimming industries are cited as
causes of women’s excessive anxiety about their
shape; while, at the same time, the continued
trend of women’s lesser earning power reinforces
a sense of dependence upon men and a conse-
quent need to “please” them. Factors that relate
less directly to the behavior manifest in eating
disorders are also cited; here, a suggestion often
advanced is that the anorexic becomes obsessed
with her food intake and her weight because these
are areas that she can control, in stark contrast
to the forces with which she contends in the social
world. The sexual abuse of women, the insuper-
able conflicts between the roles (wife/mother/em-
ployee) they are expected to play, the subordina-
tion of their own needs and schedules to those of
other people, are features of women’s lives that
might explain the drastic sense of psychological
heteronomy to which anorexia could appear as a
solution. (Dolan and Gitzinger 1994; Fallon,
Katzman, and Wooley 1994, Lawrence 1987).
This socio-cultural style of explanation seems
worlds apart from that—in terms of childhood
experience, unconscious wishes, parental ima-
gos, and psychological defenses—invoked in psy-
choanalysis. Can a psychoanalytical outlook make
any use of feminist insights about contemporary
culture, or must the two approaches pass each
other by? If a psychoanalyst, as a feminist, be-
lieves that sexual inequality in society adversely
affects women’s mental health, will that belief
will be relevant to her work as an analyst?
I consider these questions in relation to Klein-
ian psychoanalysis, and I examine the accounts
given by two Kleinian psychoanalysts of their
work with anorexic patients. At first sight, this
may seem perverse: Klein’s theory has, on the
whole, been rejected by feminist theorists and
most of those who have turned to psychoanalysis
have emphasized their distance from her thought.
(A recent wave of feminist interest in Klein, how-
ever, has begun to question this negative verdict.
See Stonebridge and Phillips 1998, for example.)
But this is part of my motivation: It seems to me
that the reasons given by feminists for dismissing
Klein are faulty, and, in my discussion of her
ideas, I try to show why. Klein’s work, supple-
mented by that of the Kleinians who have fol-
lowed her, develops from and expands upon some
of the ideas Freud pursued in his late writings.
Kleinian psychanalysis provides a coherent and
worked-out account of the mind and of what is
involved in psychoanalysis, in relation to which
one can consider the questions raised above. Of
course, what we learn from the case of Kleinian
psychoanalysis will not be generalizable to all
psychoanalytical theories, but only by narrowing
down questions about psychoanalysis and femi-
nism can they acquire enough determinacy to be
answered at all.
I begin by outlining the central ideas in Klein’s
contribution to psychoanalytical theory, in order
to identify the places (if any) at which her ac-
count of the development and dynamics of men-
tal life allows for the impact of the social world.
Klein’s Theory
At the core of Kleinian theory and practice is
the idea that the unconscious mind constitutes
an “internal world,” within which the self is
represented as standing in various relationships
to its “internal objects.” The shape of an individ-
ual’s internal world determines the possibilities
of self-expression available to them, and is, there-
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fore, the key to understanding their personality.
Klein (disagreeing with Freud’s “primary narcis-
sism” hypothesis) maintained that there are ob-
ject relations from birth: The human instincts
“seek out” the objects they require. A newborn
infant, for example, automatically makes for his
mother’s breast (Klein 1959, 248). But the ob-
jects and the nature of our relations with them
change dramatically under the weight of early
infantile experience—in particular, the experi-
ence of being mothered. Klein is explicit about
the crucial role this experience plays in shaping
psychic development: Without care of a relative-
ly stable and consistent nature, the infant will be
unable to advance from its early, highly disinte-
grated, psychic structure and acquire a more
accurate grasp of reality. The theoretical impor-
tance of the mother in Klein’s thought is unprec-
edented in psychoanalytical thinking, yet most
feminist thinkers who have welcomed this focus
have either neglected or explicitly rejected her
thought and turned instead to the “objects-rela-
tions” school that grew out of it.
Despite Klein’s acknowledgement of the de-
velopmental influence of environmental factors,
feminists have said, pejoratively, that her ac-
count is “determinist” (Chodorow 1978, 47,
124), and “short-circuited by her insistence on . .
. psychic life as instinctual rather than social”
(Eichenbaum and Orbach 1985, 32). I think this
is because, in common with so many feminists
(and social reformers of other types), they have
an exaggerated suspicion of the category of the
“innate,” and are therefore reluctant to accept
Klein’s view that environmental factors are not
the only determinants of the personality.2 For
Klein, rather, the newborn infant brings to the
world the instinctual nature that characterizes
human beings, and the development of the child,
and then the adult, is a product of the interaction
between “external” influences and the “inter-
nal” influence of instinctual forces. (I will have
more to say about Chodorow’s and Orbach’s
appropriations of psychoanalysis later).
The instinctual endowment postulated by Klein
entails that there is psychic conflict at the heart
of our being. Klein, controversially, follows the
later Freud in hypothesizing the existence of the
“death drive,” an innate, destructive force along-
side the benign and more creative “libidinal”
instinct that Freud had recognized from the out-
set. In Klein’s view, anxiety is not always a re-
sponse to an external threat; it is stimulated also
by the subject’s sense of his own aggression and
destructiveness (Klein 1946, 4). Prior to any chal-
lenge posed by the environment, human beings
confront the “internal” challenge, set by their
nature, of mastering their own violent instincts
and the severe anxiety to which these give rise
(Klein 1930, 220). The opposed life and death
instincts are discharged onto the infant’s objects:
The breast that satisfies hunger is represented as
a “good,” loved breast; in its absence, the hun-
gry infant discharges its aggression on a fanta-
sized “bad,” persecuting object. The earliest “ob-
jects,” then, are represented in terms that are
extremely idealized or vilified, according to the
instinct they are charged with.
Klein describes the dominant psychic defense
mechanisms of the earliest months of life as fan-
tasies of introjection, projection, splitting, and
projective identification.3 By means of introjec-
tion, the infant fantasizes that an object—usually
a “good” one—has been installed within his self
and is available for his satisfaction. Projection is
primarily used to eject “bad” objects outside,
either in an attack on an external figure, or
merely to expel them from the self. Splitting and
projective identification often go together: Typi-
cally, the infant may “split” off an intolerable
part of his self, and relocate it, in phantasy, in an
external object. A cost of this strategy is that the
object, understood as the bad self, becomes a
source of great persecutory anxiety as the infant
fears retaliation from his own alienated impulses.
Klein complicates the picture with her account of
envy (fully worked out late in her career; see Klein
1957), an emotion to which she accords enormous
importance. Envious attacks, discharging the infant’s
destructiveness, are launched against “good”
objects that are perceived to be outside. Again,
the prototypical “object” here is the mother’s breast,
envied because it is both separate and needed,
and the infant finds this dependence intolerable.
The experience of being mothered fosters psy-
chic development and integration in a number of
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ways. Through repeated encounters with the
mother across time, the infant learns that she is
an object that persists and, therefore, that the
good and bad breast are not distinct, but aspects
of a single entity—a mother who is sometimes
obliging, sometimes absent. The “good” and
“bad” objects are superseded by more realistic,
qualified ones: internalised parental figures, for
example, that (in the best scenario), play helpful
roles, providing benevolent models for identifi-
cation. The realization that his mother survives
his various attacks makes the infant less afraid of
his own aggression, and, in consequence, less
inclined to locate it outside himself: This makes
for greater integration of parts of the self. Wil-
fred Bion, in his development of Kleinian theory,
suggested that the mother functions as a container
for the infant’s unbearable feelings: Receiving
and understanding the infant’s anger and dis-
tress, she “returns” them to him in a manage-
able, more meaningful, form. If the mother is
seen in this way, as someone who “feeds” her
child psychologically as well as physically, the
psychoanalyst will appear to be merely continu-
ing, or perhaps improving upon, this aspect of
maternal labor.
In Klein’s view, unconscious phantasy, express-
ing and modifying the states of our internal world,
underlies all our conscious mental life and gener-
ates its significance. Our choices, actions, and
relationships in the “real” world symbolically
manifest—in most cases, at least—transactions
within our internal world. (In cases of severe
psychological difficulty, the capacity of symbol-
formation may itself be inhibited. The study of
such dysfunction has been developed much fur-
ther, especially through the work of Hanna Segal
and Wilfred Bion, since Klein’s seminal 1930
paper). For Kleinians, our internal world has
primacy in two dimensions: chronologically, in-
sofar as mental life begins with the infant’s om-
nipotent attempts to manage the chaos of its
instincts; and explanatorily, insofar as the cur-
rent state of one’s internal world determines the
meaning that the “real” world can have. What
needs to be emphasized is the extent to which
even a roughly accurate grasp of reality is, for
Kleinians, a developmental achievement, arrived
at by progressive modification of a very crazy
starting point. (As most of the infantile fantasies
attributed by Klein to her patients confirm. The
wildly unrealistic, persecutory phantasy of the
“combined parent figure,” in which the child’s
parents are sadistically depicted as engaged in
violent, destructive intercourse, injuring each oth-
er with teeth, nails, genitals, and so on is a much-
discussed example [Klein 1932, 200]). Stephen
Robinson (intending this comment to be taken as
a criticism of Kleinians) aptly sums up their aim:
“not to demonstrate how phantasy modifies re-
ality but how reality modifies phantasy” (1984,
180).
The task of a Kleinian analyst is to acquaint
the patient (in the face of great resistance) with
his internal world. Possession of this knowledge,
if it can be had, is therapeutic because it produces
in the analysand both a more accurate picture of
reality and a more integrated ego: Patterns of
projection come to be understood, for example,
and the withdrawal of those projections allows
parts of the self to be recognized.
The Impact of the Social World
Klein’s account suggests two obvious paths
for consideration, in seeking to understand what
psychological relevance (if any) it attributes to
the social world. On the one hand, thinking in
diachronic terms, we can enquire whether Klein-
ian theory recognizes social conditions as an
influence on psychological development; on the
other hand, synchronically, we can ask how (if at
all) the theory conceives of the impact of “exter-
nal” situations on an individual at a particular
moment.
The first is easily acknowledged by Klein. The
mother’s influence on the development of the
child’s object relations is, we have seen, far-reach-
ing. So there are many ways in which the culture
she inhabits can determine, “through” her, as-
pects of the child’s personality. The subject of
childcare itself is, especially in recent decades,
heavily laden with cultural strictures. (And, of
course, psychoanalysts have figured among the
“experts” whose ideas have shaped the ideology
of childcare. In Britain, John Bowlby’s and W. D.
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Winnicott’s ideas about childrearing were espe-
cially popularized and had a wider impact on the
public than Klein’s [Riley 1983]). The mother’s
response to her child’s needs; her ways of han-
dling, feeding, weaning, toilet-training, and talk-
ing to him: all these culturally mediated activities
affect the sort of maternal “object” that the child
internalizes. Feminists influenced by psychoana-
lytical theory have emphasized this developmen-
tal path and added a suggestion: that, under
conditions of sexual inequality, it serves to re-
produce invidious sex-based differentiations. Thus
Orbach suggests that mothers (often unconscious-
ly) “train” their daughters for future subordina-
tion, “directing [them] in gender-appropriate
ways,” and conveying the message that their
“dependency needs” are unacceptable (1993, 24).
And Chodorow argues that the current division
of parental labor (in which women do virtually
all of it) “produces psychological self-definition
and capacities appropriate to mothering in wom-
en and curtails and inhibits these capacities and
this self-definition in men” (1978, 208). The
theoretical presupposition on which these femi-
nist claims rely—that the mother is a conduit of
the social world—is wholly Kleinian; however,
Klein’s account, we will see, also provides grounds
for criticisms of these claims.
The second, synchronic, path—from the ex-
ternal, social world that surrounds an individual
to her psychological apprehension of it—is not,
for Kleinians, straightforward. Contact with re-
ality is always mediated by the internal world
and often distorted by its pressures. The external
world signifies only at one “remove,” and the
object of a psychoanalyst’s interest will be the
subjective process of its assimilation—its mean-
ing for the patient—rather than reality “in it-
self.” An example provided by Valerie Sinason
illustrates this. Her patient, Ahmed (an eight-
year old Asian boy) expresses anxiety about the
racist attacks that his future stepmother, about
to arrive in London, may experience. Sinason,
relating this to other comments he has made in
the session, discerns underlying feelings of exclu-
sion and displacement aroused by his stepmoth-
er’s impending arrival. “The external attacks not
only cause suffering in their own right but they
also add to it, stirring up internal collaborators.
Ahmed’s jealousy of his new mother’s relation-
ship to his father found sadistic solace in seeing
the racist stone-throwing re-enacted in his fa-
ther’s wish to see her locked up at home” (Sina-
son 1989, 226). Sinason indicates that the way in
which psychoanalysts can help their patients is
by pointing out this “internal collaboration”:
“There is terrible racism in the East End, but had
I stayed with the external reality I would not
have understood the extra, internal fear of dis-
placement that Ahmed was suffering” (224).
This example suggests that even if social pres-
sures—“terrible racism”—may be acknowledged
by an analyst, they do not fall within the con-
cerns of the analysis: Its focus is the patient’s
internal world. Does Kleinian explanation, then,
render a feminist approach to psychopathology,
concerned with such “social pressures,” otiose?
Before we take up this question, let us examine
the accounts given by two Kleinian psychoana-
lysts, Leslie Sohn and Harold Boris, of their
work with anorexic patients.4
The Psychoanalysis of Anorexia
Both Sohn and Boris describe features of the
transference of their anorexic (and bulimic) pa-
tients in order to make inferences about their
object relations. Sohn documents a patient’s hy-
percritical, “spoiling” attitude toward the sug-
gestions put forward in the analytic sessions and
sees, in this rejection of his “analytic food,: an-
other version of her anorexic difficulties with
“real” food—both of which are to be explained,
ultimately, as effects of a disturbed internal rela-
tionship. This patient seems, to Sohn, bent on
attacking any “giving and sharing of pleasure”:
The overall picture suggests an internal world in
which “an envious attack on the mother and the
mother’s breast” has occurred, prohibiting the
patient from identification with a giving figure
and inhibiting any enjoyment from food (or any-
thing else) (Sohn 1985, 52). In his paper, Sohn
discusses material drawn from five patients and
finds that, despite differences in the severity of
the cases, there are some strong similarities: In
particular, envy of the breast is found to be a
6  PPP / VOL. 8, NO. 1 / MARCH 2001
central factor in anorexic and bulimic “states of
mind,” along with various mechanisms that work
against the possibility of any awareness of that
envy.
Boris, in two papers on anorexia published in
1984, also finds envy of the mother to be an
important factor. In his view, envy can make it
impossible for an adolescent daughter to take on
a body like her mother’s: Her envious attack on
the maternal breast deprives her of a good object
to identify herself with. Instead, she has only a
breast “ruined and deformed by spite” (Boris
1984a, 317). This is the unconscious meaning of
the emaciated appearance that the anorexic pa-
tient acquires. Boris further suggests that the
experience of hunger, sought in anorexia as a
constant companion, may serve the defensive
function of obliterating any other pain: Anorexic
women cannot bear to experience need or want.
To dissociate themselves from such feelings, they
resort to projective identification. This can be
observed in the dynamics of the patients’ fami-
lies: The parents, terrified that their daughter
may die, become desperate for her to eat. In this
way they take on the “wanting” in her place
(316). Boris, like Sohn, emphasizes the difficulty
of treating anorexic patients: They tend not to
consider their anorexia a problem. Precisely be-
cause anorexia provides the patient with a solu-
tion to a problem, a “therapeutic alliance” of the
kind forged with other patients is extremely dif-
ficult to build.
These accounts display a striking convergence:
Both involve a difficulty in maternal identifica-
tion, which is complicated by the patient’s early
infantile attitudes (especially envy and aggres-
sion) toward her mother. Perhaps the symptoms
of anorexia (a disorder in eating) suggest the
nature of the underlying conflict (rooted in the
infantile feeding situation) rather directly. None-
theless, it is important to note that one cannot
generalize in advance about the psychic meaning
of all such behaviors. Even if it is likely that
anorexia manifests unresolved conflict in an early
feeding relationship, other explanations are pos-
sible. Psychoanalytical explanation is “fine-
grained.” (Indeed, Boris cautions against jump-
ing to the “obvious” analytical conclusion in the
treatment of anorexic patients. He argues that
the “oral” conflict so blatantly suggested by their
symptoms can serve as a convenient “screen” for
later oedipal/sexual conflicts, and that an uncon-
scious rationale for their “wasted” physique may
be to complicate the possibility of any sexual
response [1984b, 439–40].)
The contrast between the (unconscious) eval-
uations that, in the psychoanalysts’ view, moti-
vate their patients and the more socially informed
evaluations that feminist accounts of anorexia
invoke is striking. For the analysts, the experi-
ences of puberty and adolescence—especially the
biological changes that occur in these stages—
force earlier conflicts to the surface, as the daugh-
ter seeks an identification that will underpin her
existence as an adult. In the infantile perspective
charted by the analysts, the mother appears as an
enormously powerful figure whose resources ex-
cite envy. Envy harnesses aggression, and, in
Boris’s view, this is expressed in the anorexic
patient’s appearance: Her physique, unconscious-
ly, is understood by her to be attacked and dam-
aged. Most feminist accounts of anorexia regard
it as a more forward-looking attitude, in direct
response to social conditions: For example, the
adolescent woman is said to be rejecting the
highly unenviable social condition of women in
general; and her eating behavior represents, rath-
er than an attack on an individual, a rejection of
adulthood (Lawrence 1984).
The psychoanalytical accounts appeal to early,
instinct-laden evaluations that float free of cur-
rent social arrangements and ideological influ-
ence: Indeed, it seems quite possible that the
same internal situation could obtain in a society
that treated women favorably. It is notable that
neither analyst appears to regard any of the pa-
tients’ cultural or socio-economic circumstances
as relevant. Boris mentions that self-starvation is
a natural way for somebody steeped in guilt to
punish themselves and suggests that the fasting
rituals of Lent and Yom Kippur manifest, in
institutional form, the same idea (1984b, 438).
He also hypothesizes that features of contempo-
rary western culture (such as the abundance of
food and the preoccupation with slimness) may
encourage the “choice” of anorexia as an expres-
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sion of conflicts that might, in other ages, have
taken a different turn. (In particular, Boris dis-
cerns an “asceticism” in anorexic psychology
that would be well suited to some religious and
political causes [1984a, 320–21]). But the direc-
tion of explanation in these suggestions is from
the individual unconscious to the cultural prac-
tices. The latter provide a vehicle for the expres-
sion of a more universal psychic constellation.5
Separate Spheres?
The psychoanalytical lack of interest in the
cultural circumstances of anorexic patients (evi-
denced in the examples we have examined) may
seem to support the conclusion, suggested earlier,
that feminist concerns about contemporary so-
cio-cultural conditions will be irrelevant to a
psychoanalytical perspective. In the shift of at-
tention, seen in Sinason’s example, from the stone-
throwing in the street to the internal sadism of
her patient, the stone-throwing itself seems to
drop out of the picture. Moreover, the accounts
given of the motivation of the anorexic patients
above, in which infantile impulses and evalua-
tions loom large, are not even compatible with
the more immediately intelligible responses to
the social world hypothesised by feminists.
Nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that the
“internal” and the “social” worlds can be sepa-
rated out in this way and that it is only the first
of the two that engages a psychoanalyst’s inter-
est. The internal world is indeed “subjective,”
structured as it is by the individual’s phantasy;
but it cannot be contrasted with the “external”
world as one might contrast the world of one’s
imaginings from the world of one’s beliefs, be-
cause phantasy affects one’s perception of, and
beliefs about, the external world. As phantasy,
according to the Kleinian understanding of the
mind, is ineliminable from mental life, it is an
illusion to think that a purely “objective” per-
spective on the world is attainable. This does not
entail epistemological relativism however: Phan-
tasy may “interfere” with perception of the ex-
ternal world to a greater or lesser extent, and, as
we have seen, it is the analyst’s task to bring
instances of such interference to the analysand’s
attention, so that they can be understood. The
process involves “triangulation,” in which the
analyst compares his perceptions with those of
the patient; the usefulness of the clinical setting is
that it generates shared “external” objects of
experience (an analyst’s utterances, for example)
in relation to which the discrepancy between the
patient’s and the analyst’s perceptions can be
displayed. In general, due to his training and the
analysis that he has undergone, the analyst’s in-
ternal world will be the more epistemologically
reliable: better able, by virtue of its stability and
integration, to underpin an appreciation of the
many facets of reality. But on occasion, of course,
it may be the analyst’s internal world—an aspect
of his “counter-transference”—that impedes
shared understanding.
The epistemological ideal suggested by Klein’s
conception of the mind is remarkably similar to
that proposed by Nietzsche in his On the Gene-
alogy of Morality, where he insists that the “pure,
will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowl-
edge” must be set aside because
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective
“knowing”; the more affects we allow to speak about a
thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for
the same thing, the more complete will be our “concept”
of the thing, our “objectivity.” (Nietzsche 1994, 92)
Psychoanalytical investigation includes the “ex-
ternal world,” but as it appears to the patient.6
What it aims to understand is the perspective
within which that world is apprehended by the
patient, the significance with which it is imbued.
Social “Provocation”
If dialogue between feminists and Kleinians is
impeded, then, it is not because their spheres of
interest do not overlap, but because the terms in
which they understand the impact of the external
world, and its motivating powers, are too dispar-
ate. This suggests that there is a way in which
dialogue can be joined, and, indeed, in which a
feminist understanding of the social world can
supply an important additional component to
Kleinian psychoanalysis.
This would require feminists to hand over the
task of unearthing an individual’s (depth-psy-
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chological) motivation to the psychoanalysts and
to embrace the idea that the world signifies sym-
bolically. Their contribution, then—informed by
their understanding of social processes—could
be an account of the ways in which these pro-
cesses may force a woman’s internal conflicts
upon her or block possible modes of escape from
them. For example, let us return to Boris’s sug-
gestions about Yom Kippur and Lent: that they
provide vehicles for the expression and purging
of individuals’ unconscious guilt. While this may
explain one function that they serve, we can see
how—once institutionalized—they may have the
further effect of reinforcing and fostering guilt in
the participants of the culture, perhaps encour-
aging a belief that such guilt is justified and not
merely based in phantasy. Recognition of this
effect suggests the need to draw a distinction
between situations whose symbolic meaning for
an individual derives (primarily) from her pro-
jection of her internal world onto them, and
those in which she is provoked into confronta-
tion with it. (This difference is ultimately a mat-
ter of degree: In all cases of symbolization, the
situation provides some grounds for bearing the
symbolic significance that it does.)
For example, Hinshelwood describes the in-
fantilizing effect that traveling by plane has on
the passengers: Belted into their seats, with trays
of food set in front of them, they “regress to the
trusting and dependent posture of the infant
strapped into a high-chair” (1995, 197). Similar-
ly, it is plausible that the mass media’s relentless
attention, documented by feminists, to the con-
tours of women’s bodies might force to the sur-
face an adolescent girl’s unease with the adult body
she feels obliged to assume. The social phenome-
non that feminists point to does not tell the whole
story of the psychic effect that psychoanalysts
investigate, but it takes us part of the way: the
“message” of the media is not identical with the
adolescent’s unconscious conflict, but it stirs it up.
The point does not apply only to symbolism.
Social situations can equally be thought to in-
duce processes of “splitting” in individuals, by
encouraging the repudiation of parts of the self.
Hinshelwood suggests that the behavior observed
in Milgram’s famous “electrical shock” experi-
ments in the 1960s can be described in these
terms: The discomfort caused by the individual’s
experience of dissonance between his judgments
and those of the people around him leads him to
surrender his capacity for moral judgment alto-
gether, and to defer to the cruel suggestions made
by the others (Hinshelwood 1997, 203–7).
Psychoanalytical treatment, Hinshelwood
points out, carries a risk of splitting common to
all “helping” relationships: The patient may di-
vest himself entirely of his ability to help himself
and allot himself a role in which he is utterly
dependent on the analyst. However, Hinshelwood
argues, psychoanalysis differs from other “advi-
sory” situations insofar as it aims to make the
patient aware of any such attempted divisions of
labor within the “research project on his own
mental state” that is undertaken (1997, 137).
Thus, while it might be said that the psychoana-
lytic situation itself “provokes” splitting (insofar
as the analyst, presenting a “blank screen,” facil-
itates the patient’s projection of his internal ob-
ject relationships onto him, in an “uncontami-
nated” transference), this is, as it were, for
“pedagogical” purposes only. The patient’s trans-
ference provides the material for the analysis,
which, if successful, will enable him to gain a
greater knowledge, and thereby control, of his
own unconscious processes. The expectation guid-
ing the analysis is that, over time, the use of
splitting in the patient will decrease as his psy-
chic integration improves.
Why should the fact of social “provocation”
be of interest to an analyst? One might object
that any recognition of it will be idle: The ana-
lyst’s task, that of understanding the patient’s
unconscious engagement with reality, remains
the same whatever the nature of that reality.
Suppose the revival of an unresolved conflict in a
patient has been provoked: Still, it can be ar-
gued, it is the conflict that is relevant for the
analysis and not the circumstances of its revival.
But, at least from the therapeutic point of view,
an analyst has an interest in knowing the strength
of a patient’s fantasies—and in this respect, there
is a significant difference between a phantasy
that can latch on to, and distort, almost any
external situation, and one that becomes domi-
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nant in the individual’s life only when reality
seems to confirm it.7 The “provoked” uncon-
scious, like an infant neglected by his mother,
does not have the help afforded by a benevolent
environment in distinguishing between the fan-
tastic and the real. An analyst needs to be aware
of the countervailing forces that impede her task
of clarifying this distinction.
Further, insofar as an analyst conceives of her
task as therapeutic, a point may be reached at
which her appreciation of social etiological fac-
tors forces her to conclude that the analysis of
individuals, even if it remains possible, is no
longer worthwhile. In a situation where very
powerful social forces militate against psychic
integration, the piecemeal attention to individu-
als’ minds will appear quixotic. In these circum-
stances, an analyst’s skills are surely better used
in understanding how social institutions are pro-
moting “primitive” processes—splitting, regres-
sion, projective identification—in the population
at large. Such an understanding would be of
value in informing attempts to transform social
and political reality and, in their wake, psychic
reality also.
Opinion will differ, of course, about how bad
things need to be before the analysis of individu-
als loses its point. At the extreme end of the
spectrum, a population terrorized by random
acts of torture seems to be a clear example of a
case where political change will be a more effec-
tive means of improving psychic integration than
psychoanalysis. In the western democracies in
the post-war period, psychoanalysts have contin-
ued, on the whole, to confine themselves to work
with individual patients. Nonetheless, they have
lent their skills, occasionally, to political debate:
One notable example was the participation of
some, in the 1980s, in Psychoanalysts for the
Prevention of Nuclear War. The members of this
group shared the view that nuclear weapons were
an especially dangerous resource for human be-
ings, insofar as they made it possible for aggres-
sion and violence to be unleashed irreparably.
War encourages and legitimizes our capacities
for splitting and projection, and an infantile con-
ception of the world as divided into wholly good
and bad “objects” (Temperley 1989). It is an
excellent example, therefore, of a situation in
which the psychoanalyst’s normative interest in
our “internal” worlds ought to lead naturally to
a concern with the external, social world.
Feminist “Literalism”
We saw earlier that, although Klein believes
that the “real” mother is an important influence
on the infant’s internalization of a maternal fig-
ure, she is not the only influence. Rather, the
experience she provides modifies the infant’s in-
nate dispositions to phantasy: The resultant in-
ternal mother is not a simple replica of the “real”
one. Some feminists who draw on psychoana-
lytic theory have wanted to retain the first part
of this story, while dissociating themselves from
the second. In particular, they reject any implica-
tion of the instincts in accounting for psycholog-
ical development. In Chodorow and in Eichen-
baum and Orbach, we find the suggestion that
explanation in terms of “social” or “relational”
factors excludes recourse to “instinctual” fac-
tors.8 This is a false opposition, at least in rela-
tion to Klein’s theory, in which object-relational
fantasies are precisely an expression of instinctu-
al impulses that become modified under the
weight of social experience.
Orbach’s and Chodorow’s descriptions of the
infant’s internalization of the mother differ mark-
edly from Klein’s in their “literalism”: This is
where, as I mentioned above, a Kleinian perspec-
tive provides grounds for criticism of theirs. They
barely acknowledge the distorting effect of phan-
tasy (which, in Klein’s account, makes the inter-
nal mother potentially so dissimilar from the real
mother); instead, the mother is presented as if
she were a direct conduit to the social world, as if
internal relationships were an accurate reflection
of social ones. In her book on anorexia, Orbach
presents infant daughters as passive recipients
(and victims) of the messages, or taboos, relating
to female behavior, that their mothers, in sexist
society, convey: “[T]he mother knowingly as well
as unconsciously distills the social laws” (1993,
24). In particular, the mother communicates to
her daughter the idea that females must suppress
their own needs. Orbach’s account of the detri-
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mental effect this has on the daughter’s psycho-
logical development casts her as a victim whose
only wishes are legitimate desires for nurturance:
“Unable to condemn the caretaker, who is still
much needed, the developing person takes into
itself the idea that it is not the responses of the
caretaker to its needs that are inappropriate, but
rather the needs . . . that are causing the problem.
Thus it berates itself for its needs and attempts to
bury them . . .” (1993, 69). This rational and
wronged daughter is a far cry from the greedy,
savage, and envious infant depicted by Klein. For
Klein, dependence is inevitably going to be a
source of difficulty because it is part of the hu-
man condition; in Orbach’s presentation, such
difficulty is the contingent outcome of patriar-
chal ideology.
Of course Klein may not be right. But her
feminist critics (even those sympathetic to psy-
choanalysis) tend to overlook the fact that the
nature of the newborn infant is an empirical
question—to be settled, presumably, by evidence.
Instead, Klein’s hypotheses are dogmatically (and
sometimes incoherently) rejected out of hand.
Moreover, even within its own terms, one can
criticize the “literalist,” sociologically-oriented,
and functionalist psychoanalytic framework
adopted by Orbach and Chodorow for its over-
generalisation. Surely a sociological perspective
ought to take more account of differences be-
tween familial structures and arrangements; for
example, single- versus two-parent families, the
effect of having same- or opposite-sex siblings,
the use of nannies or creches, and so on.9 These
generalizations, in combination with the lack of
differentiation between individual mothers’ psy-
chologies, result in a picture that is strangely
unpsychoanalytical, and—in comparison with
Kleinian theory—lacking in explanatory power.
As Elizabeth Young-Bruehl remarks (in connec-
tion with Orbach’s work): “A theory that equates
the mother-as-person and mother-as-cultural-im-
perative cannot take an intrapsychic mother—a
mother of a patient’s phantasy—into account. . . .
But this means . . . that it is impossible to explain
why one young woman develops an eating disor-
der and another only conforms to her mother
and her culture by dieting . . .” (1993, 323).
These feminist “translations” of psychoanaly-
sis depict the unconscious as standing in closer,
and more systematic, relations to social reality
than Klein’s theory allows. And the lesson to be
learned from them applies, not just to feminist
appropriations of psychoanalysis, but more wide-
ly: that an over-hasty concern to acknowledge
the impact on individuals of the social world can
lead to an unnecessarily impoverished psycholo-
gy, lacking in explanatory power.10 Acknowl-
edgement of the role of unconscious phantasy in
mental life does not require us to deny that the
“real” world may powerfully disturb us.11
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Notes
1. I have not avoided using normative terms (disor-
der, illness) for psychological conditions such as anor-
exia. Freud conceived of psychoanalysis as a branch of
medical science, and most practicing analysts continue
to regard their work as therapeutic and corrective. I
have left to one side, in this paper, the strand of femi-
nist thought that rejects such normative notions (and,
often, the medical/psychiatric establishment) as ideo-
logical and oppressive in themselves. For discussion of
this view, see Ussher 1991, chap. 7.
2. Feminists have rightly unmasked implausible and
self-serving ascriptions, made by men, of sex-differen-
tiated traits to “nature,” and have pointed instead to
the social conditions that produce such differences.
Another feminist worry has been that claims of com-
monality among women will lead to the neglect of
hugely significant differences between them: a false
“universalism.” A third worry is that acknowledge-
ment of an innate predisposition to, say, a certain sort
of behavior amounts to “determinism,” and renders
any attempt to change that behavior futile. But none of
these mistakes are necessitated by Klein’s view.
3. Klein 1946. The Kleinian understanding of the
“schizoid mechanisms”—most especially that of pro-
jective identification—has developed a great deal since
Klein’s seminal article. It is not necessary for my pur-
poses here to explore these developments.
4. The application of the term Kleinian is, necessar-
ily, a matter of degree, as most practitioners indulge in
some theoretical eclecticism. It seems to me that the
features I discuss in these psychoanalytical explana-
tions can, unproblematically, be termed Kleinian.
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5. See Klein’s “postscript” to her 1959 article (which
records a discussion she had with an anthropologist)
for a nice illustration of this direction of explanation.
6. See Ann Scott (1996, chap. 1) for an interesting
discussion of how Jeffrey Masson (1984), by overlook-
ing this point, targets his attack on Freudianism at a
caricature of Freud’s position.
7. For the notion of “domination,” see Gardner
1993, 164–65. Reality-testing is an essential part of
psychological development, as it develops the capacity
to differentiate between the internal and external worlds.
It follows that if an external situation does not seem to
differ from the internal one, the subject is deprived of a
means of putting phantasy into perspective.
8. Eichenbaum and Orbach (1985, 32) were quoted
above. Chodorow draws a contrast between the psy-
choanalysts’ “emphasis on the difficult libidinal path
to heterosexuality’”and the “relational aspects of the
situation” (1978, 114).
9. Chodorow acknowledges that she “fudges” the
issue of sexual orientation (by talking only of hetero-
sexual couples), but her account is a good deal more
abstract than that.
10. The same tendency can be observed in writings
by members of the Frankfurt School and their follow-
ers. For criticisms of Marcuse’s appropriation of Freud,
for example, see MacIntyre 1970, chap. 4.
11. A failure to appreciate this point has marked a
great deal of the discussion, critical of psychoanalysis
and generated by a variety of events, that has had such
media coverage during the last two decades. The
abandonment by Freud of his early “seduction theo-
ry,” for example, is discussed as if the theory that
replaced it (invoking infantile sexual phantasy) was
incompatible with the acknowledgement of any real
sexual abuse. Alarm at the prevalence of childhood
abuse shown by the Cleveland inquiry in Britain and
allegations of cases of “False Memory Syndrome” add-
ed fuel to the debate about psychoanalysis. For discus-
sion of these topics, see Scott (1996, passim).
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